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Payton violation issue, and the court's analysis should have fo-
cused on whether the defendant's confession was sufficiently atten-
uated from his illegal arrest.5
2
Although the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
rights of criminal suspects, it has a superior interest in protecting
society from an admitted murderer. The Payton rule, intended to
protect the sanctity of a suspect's home, is preserved by sup-
pressing any evidence acquired while in the home. The effect of
suppressing a defendant's voluntary, station-house confession is to
burden criminal prosecutions without providing a corresponding
deterrent to illegal police action. The Harris court, citing the inter-
play between two separate and distinct state constitutional provi-
sions, suppressed a station-house confession despite the existence
of probable cause to arrest the defendant. As the dissent correctly
exhorted, "[t]he history of [the] NY Constitution... and its proud
right to counsel tradition.., do not support leapfrogging beyond
the United States Supreme Court's decision in this procedurally
convoluted case."5 3
Maryann Gianchino
New York Court of Appeals concludes law enforcement officials
must have reasonable suspicion that a residence contains illegal
drugs before conducting a "canine sniff" of the premises
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, as
well as its New York State Constitution counterpart, is designed to
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.1 Exactly
Dep't) (en route to Central Booking and before Miranda warnings given, defendant sponta-
neously made admissible statements), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 860, 561 N.E.2d 900, 560
N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1990).
'2 See Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 446, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). Judge Bellacosa cites a key chain of attenuating events: change of scene from
"protected" dwelling to "unprotected" precinct; passage of about one hour; and renewed
Miranda warnings and waivers. Id. (citing People v. Harris, 124 A.D.2d 472, 475, 507
N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (1st Dep't 1986), rev'd, 72 N.Y.2d 614, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990)).
53 Id. at 447, 570 N.E.2d at 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
1 See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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what constitutes a search, however, continues to become more diffi-
cult to determine as law enforcement officers employ increasingly
innovative and probing investigative techniques.2 In recent years,
for example, drug agents have successfully used specially trained
dogs to assist them in detecting controlled substances.3 In United
States v. Place,4 the United States Supreme Court determined
that although "a person possesses a privacy interest in the con-
tents of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment[,] ... the manner in which information is obtained through
Id. The language of the analogous section of the New York State Constitution is identical.
See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Accordingly, the rights conferred by each are generally similar.
The New York courts in the past, however, have not hesitated to interpret this provision of
the state constitution more liberally than its federal counterpart. See, e.g., People v. P.J.
Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 307, 501 N.E.2d 556, 561-62, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 912-13 (1986)
(requiring more exacting standard for issuance of search warrant under New York State
Constitution), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987); People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 433, 494
N.E.2d 444, 445, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (1986) (declining to adopt Supreme Court interpre-
tation as matter of state constitutional law on remand); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417,
424-26, 488 N.E.2d 451, 456-58, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 635-36 (1985) (declining to apply Gates
rule, which examined "totality of the circumstances" in determining probable cause); People
v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 406-07, 488 N.E.2d 439, 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 624 (1985)
(same).
2 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) ("pen register" used to record
telephone numbers dialed by monitoring electronic impulses); People v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347,
353-54 (1967) (FBI used electronic surveillance equipment to monitor conversation in public
telephone booth). Although it is relatively simple for a court to determine whether law en-
forcement officials have conducted a typical, i.e., physical, search, the advent of modern
technology has complicated the issue of what constitutes a search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. Although the Katz Court noted that "[ilt is
true that the absence of . . . [physical] penetration [of a given place] was at one time
thought to foreclose... Fourth Amendment inquiry," this requirement of penetration is no
longer representative of the law today. Id. at 352-53. Thus, by recognizing that the fourth
amendment is designed to protect people, and not places, the Katz Court extended the
scope of fourth amendment inquiry, thereby complicating the determination of whether im-
plementation of a particular investigative procedure constitutes a search. See id.
The Supreme Court noted this dilemma as early as 1963: "This Court has by and large
steadfastly enforced the Fourth Amendment against physical intrusions... [blut our course
of decisions, it now seems, has been outflanked by the technological advances of the very
recent past." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 471 (1963).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983) (canine sniff at airport
successful in detecting contraband in passenger's closed luggage); United States v. Colyer,
878 F.2d 469, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (canine sniff revealing narcotics within Amtrak sleeper
compartment); United States v. Mayomi, 873 F.2d 1049, 1050 (7th Cir. 1989) (canine sniff
revealed presence of narcotics in mail packages); see also Loewy, Protecting Citizens from
Cops and Crooks: An Assessment of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment During the 1982 Term, 62 N.C.L. Rav. 329, 331-32 (1984) (noting success of
canine sniff in Place and touting its effectiveness in protecting innocent citizens and in
fighting crime).
1 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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* . . [a canine sniff] is much less intrusive than a typical search."5
The Court also noted that since "the sniff discloses only the pres-
ence or absence of narcotics[,] ... the information obtained [about
the contents of the luggage] is limited." Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that the "exposure of the respondent's luggage, which was
located in a public place, to a trained canine ... did not constitute
a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."'7 Re-
cently, however, in People v. Dunn," the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that a canine sniff conducted by police in a common
hallway9 outside of a defendant's apartment door constitutes a
search under article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitu-
tion,' 0 notwithstanding its conclusion that because the Place ra-
tionale is equally applicable to canine sniffs in the residential con-
text, fourth amendment protections are not invoked. 1
In Dunn, after obtaining information that illegal drugs were
5 Id. at 707. The Court stated that since the canine sniff procedure does not require law
enforcement officials to open one's luggage, it therefore does not expose non-contraband
items that typically remain hidden from public view. Id. Thus, the Court reasoned that this
technique is minimally intrusive since it is less revealing than an ordinary search, such as
when an officer detains a passenger to physically rummage through his closed baggage. Id.
6 Id. The Court explained that although the canine sniff enables police to detect the
presence of narcotics within personal luggage, it does not subject the owner of the property
to the possible embarrassment and inconvenience that can result from "less discriminate
and more intrusive investigative methods." Id.
7 Id. The Court based its holding on the following rationale: "In these respects, the
canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so lim-
ited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure." Id.
8 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2830
(1991).
9 Id. at 21, 564 N.E.2d at 1055, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 389. The court noted that since the
defendant failed to preserve the issue of whether the police were lawfully present in the
common hallway outside Qf his apartment, this was not a proper subject for review. Id. at 21
n.2, 564 N.E.2d at 1055 n.2, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 389 n.2.
10 Id. at 25, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
'- Id. at 23-24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391. The Dunn court reasoned that
under the Place rationale, the fact that the target of the canine sniff was a residence rather
than a piece of luggage was irrelevant to the determination of the defendant's rights under
the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. The court based this conclu-
sion on its interpretation of Place and stated that since the determinative factor in the
Place decision was the fact that the canine sniff reveals only evidence of criminality, regard-
less of where the procedure is conducted, the mere fact that the defendant's residence was
subjected to this investigative technique did not warrant fourth amendment protection. Id.
While the narrow category of evidence revealed by a canine sniff was clearly one of the
factors that the Place court considered in reaching its conclusion, it is suggested that the
Dunn court was incorrect in concluding that this factor alone was determinative. See Place,
462 U.S. at 707.
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being stored in an apartment leased by the defendant,12 the police
arranged for a narcotics detection dog to perform a canine sniff in
the corridor outside of the defendant's door.'3 The dog "alerted,'1 4
indicating that narcotics were located inside the apartment. 5
Based on both the dog's reaction and previously obtained informa-
tion,' the police procured a search warrant, entered the defend-
ant's residence, and seized large amounts of cocaine and mari-
juana.1 7 A subsequent search of another apartment leased to the
defendant similarly resulted in the seizure of contraband.'" Facing
various drug related charges, the defendant moved to suppress all
of the evidence that had been seized during these searches, assert-
ing that the canine sniff itself constituted a warrantless search un-
supported by probable cause.' 9 The defendant's motion was de-
12 People v. Dunn, 155 A.D.2d 75, 78, 533 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 77
N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2830 (1991).
Before the police conducted the canine sniff, they had already acquired a substantial
amount of information which led them to believe that drugs were being stored in the de-
fendant's apartment. Id. Among other things, police were aware of the following: State Po-
lice Sergeant Kenneth Gellart, one of the defendant's neighbors, had smelled marijuana
odors emanating from the defendant's apartment on numerous occasions. Id. Additionally,
Jeffrey Osgood, the apartment complex's maintenance man, had entered the defendant's
apartment approximately three and one-half months prior to the canine sniff and observed
what he believed to be cocaine in various locations within the defendant's apartment. Id.
Osgood also observed a triple-beam scale, plastic bags, marijuana roaches, and sticks of in-
cense in the apartment. Id. Finally, Osgood smelled a strong odor of marijuana emanating
from a closed closet in the defendant's bedroom. Id.
'a Id. at 79, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
Id. Amber, a highly trained drug-sniffing canine, is certified and annually evaluated
by the Canine Training Center, and upon picking up the scent of marijuana, cocaine, heroin,
hashish, or crack, she is trained to scratch. Id. This scratching is known as an "alert", and
the court noted that Amber had correctly alerted on many occasions in the past. Id.
5 Id. After arriving in the hallway where the defendant's apartment was located, Am-
ber headed directly for the defendant's apartment and began scratching the door. Id. The
officers conducting the investigation did not enter the apartment, however, until they had
obtained a warrant. See id.
16 Id. Officers Gramaglia and Senecal, who had conducted the canine sniff, surmised
that drugs were on the premises after considering all of the information that they had ob-
tained. Id.
17 Id. Based on affidavits submitted by officers Gramaglia and Senecal, the magistrate
issued a warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's Hamburg, New York apartment.
Id. The police executed the warrant and found large quantities of cocaine and marijuana,
drug paraphernalia, two handguns, and $6,200 in cash in the apartment, on the defendant's
person and in his car. Id. at 77, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
18 Id. The second warrant was executed the next day at the defendant's apartment in
Cheektowaga, New York, and additional drugs and contraband were seized by the police. Id.
19 Id. at 79-80, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 259. The defendant's counsel argued that since the
canine sniff constituted a warrantless search, and the remaining allegations against the de-
fendant were insufficient to establish probable cause, the original warrant application was
1991] 1211
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nied, and he was subsequently convicted in the Supreme Court,
Erie County, after a jury trial.20 The Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, affirmed and granted leave to appeal.21
Upon further review, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed
the courts below, but solely on the ground that the police had a
reasonable suspicion that the defendant's apartment contained il-
legal narcotics prior to conducting the canine sniff.22 Writing for
the court, Judge Titone explained that although the defendant's
fourth amendment rights had not been violated under the ration-
ale set forth in Place,23 it was necessary to ascertain whether the
New York State Constitution provided greater protections.24 The
Dunn court determined that the "analysis adopted by the Su-
preme Court in [Place] . . . threaten[s] to undercut the right of
[New York] citizens to be free from unreasonable government in-
trusions. '25 Based on this conclusion, the Dunn court expressly re-
jected the Place rationale26 and focussed its analysis on whether
there had been an intrusion into an area where the defendant was
entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 27 Grounding its de-
insufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant. Id.
20 Id. at 77, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 257-58.
21 Id. at 89, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
21 Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 22, 564 N.E.2d at 1056, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
23 Id. at 23-24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391; supra note 11 and accompany-
ing text.
24 Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391. The court was
careful to note that its previous decision in People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 431 N.E.2d 267,
446 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1981), was not clearly applicable to the Dunn facts in determining
whether a search had occurred. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
391. The court in Dunn distinguished the facts of Price by indicating that they were more
similar to the facts considered by the United States Supreme Court in Place since both
cases involved the exposure of one's luggage at an airport to a canine sniff. Id. However, the
court also made one point perfectly clear: "Nowhere in Price did we even intimate that the
investigative tool employed there did not constitute a search because it could disclose only
the presence or absence of contraband." Id. Thus, the Dunn court stressed the fact that the
grounds upon which it decided the Price case, namely, the reduced expectation of privacy
one has in luggage once it is placed in the hands of a common carrier, were inapposite to
those relied upon by the Supreme Court in Place. Id.
"I Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
26 Id. The Dunn court stated, "Because we conclude that the Place analysis [would
diminish the expectation of privacy enjoyed by New York citizens], we decline to follow it."Id.
2 Id. at 24-25, 564 N.E.2d at 1057-58, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92. The court reasoned, "It
is one thing to say that a sniff at an airport is not a search, but quite another to say that a
sniff can never be a search. The question always to be asked is whether the use of a trained
dog intrudes on a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id. at 25 n.4, 564 N.E.2d at 1058 n.4,
563 N.Y.S.2d at 392 n.4 (quoting United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366 (2d Cir.),
1212
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cision on the premise that the home "has traditionally been ac-
corded a heightened expectation of privacy,"2 the court ruled that
the canine sniff of the defendant's residence constituted a search
under the New York State Constitution.2  However, the court
thereafter noted the discriminate nature of this investigative tech-
nique3 and recognized its effectiveness in combatting crime,-1 and
thus required only that police have a reasonable suspicion that ille-
gal narcotics are located within a residence before performing a ca-
nine sniff.3
2
In an effort to protect the citizens of New York state from
unreasonable government intrusions,3 it appears that the Dunn
court has instead unnecessarily broadened the scope of the term
"search" within the meaning of article I, section 12 of the New
York State Constitution. The Dunn court appropriately directed
its analysis towards determining whether the privacy of the de-
fendant's home had been violated.34 However, the court initially
disregarded the sui generis35 nature of the canine-sniff procedure
in concluding that a search had occurred only to subsequently rely
on the uniqueness of this investigative technique as the basis for
imposing a minimally restrictive reasonable suspicion standard on
the police."8 This bifurcated dependence on the character of the
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985)) (emphasis in original).
28 Id. at 25, 564 N.E.2d at 1057-58, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92. The Dunn court was unwill-
ing to consider the fact that the canine-sniff technique can disclose only evidence of crimi-
nality in determining whether a search had occurred. Id. at 24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563
N.Y.S.2d at 391. The court simply observed that the police were able to obtain private in-
formation about the contents of the defendant's residence, making no reference to the na-
ture of such information, and noted that the home "has traditionally been accorded a
heightened expectation of privacy." Id. at 25, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
29 Id. at 25, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
30 Id. at 26, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
21 Id.
2 Id. Although the court concluded that the canine sniff of the defendant's apartment
constituted a search, it did not impose the typical probable cause standard on police. See id.
Rather, the court announced a more relaxed reasonable suspicion standard under which the
police were to operate in the future. See id.
33 Supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
24 See Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 25, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392. It is asserted
that while the court's analysis was properly directed, its conclusion that the privacy of the
defendant's home was violated is erroneous. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
25 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (noting that canine sniff is sui generis); supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
2'6 See Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 24-25, 564 N.E.2d at 1057-58, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92. In the
initial phase of its analysis of whether a search had been conducted, the court ignored (1)
the fact that the canine sniff only discloses evidence of criminality, (2) the nonintrusive
12131991]
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canine-sniff technique is unpersuasive when viewed in light of the
more consistent rationale adopted by the appellate division,
namely, that "[a] suspect has no greater or more reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the public air outside of his residence than in
the public air outside of his belongings. ' 37 Although the Dunn
court correctly maintained that the absence of physical entry into
a defendant's residence is not itself determinative of the issue con-
cerning whether the constitutionally protected sanctity of his home
has been violated," it is suggested that the majority improperly
neglected to consider the atypical qualities of the canine-sniff tech-
nique in the initial phase of its analysis. 39 While the canine sniff
does enable the police to detect the contents of a private place, the
means of detection cannot be ignored.40
Under the approach adopted by the court in Dunn, it is diffi-
cult to contemplate any investigative procedure that would enable
manner in which the evidence is obtained, and (3) the unique and discriminate nature of the
technique. See id; supra note 28.
However, after reasoning that the use of the canine-sniff technique under these circum-
stances constituted a search, the court immediately noted that its inquiry was yet incom-
plete. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 26, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392. At this juncture, the
court stated that it was necessary to take into account the unique qualities of the canine-
sniff procedure, as well as the fact that the police could effectively employ the canine sniff
to combat crime. Id. Thus, after evaluating these considerations, the court diluted the tradi-
tional prerequisite threshold for conducting a search from probable cause to reasonable sus-
picion. Id.
37 People v. Dunn, 155 A.D.2d 75, 86, 533 N.Y.S.2d 257, 264 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 77
N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2830 (1991). It
is necessary to note that Judges Simons and Bellacosa concurred only in the result, of the
Court of Appeals' decision. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 26, 564 N.E.2d at 1059, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
These judges stressed that in their view, in accordance with the opinion by Judge M.
Dolores Denman of the appellate division, a search had not occurred. Id.
See Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 25, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392. The court
indicates, by example, that it is certainly possible to conduct a search without entering one's
residence. Id. (noting that implementation of electronic surveillance technique constitutes
search).
" See id. The Dunn court attempted to draw an analogy between the odors emanating
from the defendant's apartment to sound waves that can be harnessed by electronic surveil-
lance equipment. Id. However, although there is some similarity in the evidence to be de-
tected, it is suggested that the court placed too much reliance on this likeness. The court
should also have directed its analysis at the means used to obtain such evidence. Under such
an approach, it is clear that while sound waves and drug odors are in some respects alike,
the techniques by which each is detected are entirely different. Cf. id. (noting that each
technique allows police to detect evidence emanating from private area). Although both
techniques enable police to acquire information about the contents of one's home, only the
canine-sniff procedure does so without the risk of detecting lawful, private activity. See
supra note 7.
" See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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law enforcement officers to detect the contents of a residence in a
manner that would not be considered a search.41 Given the de-
structive impact that drugs have on modern society and the inves-
tigative ingenuity, nonintrusiveness, and effectiveness that the ca-
nine-sniff technique represents, it is suggested that the Dunn court
erred when it failed to consider the nature and character of the
canine-sniff procedure in reasoning that a search had occurred. As
a result of the holding in Dunn, it seems that "as between cops
and crooks, the [New York Court of Appeals] gave [crooks] the
upper hand. '42
Mark A. Varrichio, Jr.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1): New York Court of Appeals fash-
ions "alter ego" test to determine whether corporate employees
are shielded from ex parte communications
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the New York Lawyer's Code
of Professional Responsibility makes it unethical for attorneys to
engage in ex parte communications with a "party" known to be
represented by counsel, absent the consent of that party's counsel.1
The scope of the term "party" is not clear when a corporation is
41 See Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 25, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392. Under the
Dunn court's approach, it is apparent that anything located in a private residence that is
detected by means of a supersensitive detection device is deserving of New York State con-
stitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure. See id.
42 Loewy, supra note 3, at 331. Professor Loewy, in reference to the Supreme Court's
decision in Place, suggests that the Court gave the police the upper hand in fighting crime
by concluding that the use of the canine-sniff technique did not constitute a search. See id.
It is suggested that as a result of the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Dunn, the
police are at a severe disadvantage in attempting to thwart the efforts of crafty drug dealers.
I N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PRoFEssioNAL RESONsmirirry, DR 7-104(A)(1) (1990). DR 7-
104(A) provides in part:
During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
1. Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by a
lawyer in that matter unless the lawyer has the prior consent of the law-
yer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
Id.
The rule was derived from Canon 9 of the American Bar Association Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, which was superseded by the American Bar Association Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility in 1970. See Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's
Client: The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 685 (1979).
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